The
logical problem of evil, the argument that the existence of evil is
logically incompatible with the existence of God, seems like a dead duck. Yes, there is evil, but evil is perfectly
compatible with a good God.
God may have good reasons for producing or allowing evil.
As a result many people have given up on logical arguments from evil. They turn to evidential arguments; granted some evil is compatible, is the huge quantity of it compatible with a good God? Even
evidential arguments from evil seem to be in trouble from our lack of
knowledge. The evil, even the huge
amounts we see, may be necessary for the good.
With our limitations we would never know that God is not carefully
maximising the balance of good over evil.
The
thing is, unless thoroughgoing utilitarianism is correct, morality does not work this way.
You
cannot just give a reason for an act and carry on as if this forgives
everything. “I hurt the child because it
was fun” or “I needed to do administer pain inducing chemicals to see if they
worked” just won’t wash. When one
excuses (or even praises) an otherwise immoral act one does so because the
reason for the apparently bad act is a greater good. We may stick needles in a baby to vaccinate
her against dangerous diseases. We may
administer pain inducing chemicals as part of an attempt to save the life of a
child with cancer. In both cases the good, immunity from disease and life,
greatly outweighs the bad.
But a
greater quantity of good is still not enough.
If I stick needles in a child I may really
enjoy it, it may fantastically improve my life way more than the brief pain
reduces the child’s enjoyment of life.
If there is any doubt in the matter of the benefit/disadvantage balance
I may recruit a number of people who enjoy watching needles being stuck into
children and share the pleasurable experience.
I may add more and more observers gaining more and more enjoyment but at
no point does the benefit to myself and the observers morally outweigh the pain to the child.
The child
is an end in herself, not to be used and abused for other’s benefit. There is a principle involved here: where
appeal is made to good outweighing evil: the
evil to each individual must be outweighed by good to that individual.
I
might feel guilt after sticking needles into a child and try to “make it up” to
the child. Cakes, toys, ice cream or
money to buy cakes, toys and ice cream may be proffered. The benefits accrue to the child, I may even
be generous enough that the benefits from the gifts outweigh the needles. If so, do the gifts excuse my act? No: I could, just as easily have given the cakes,
toys and ice cream without sticking needles in the child. The needles are unnecessary for the cakes,
toys and ice cream. There is another
principle involved: to act as a moral
reason the evil must be necessary to secure the good.
Now take
Abigail. Abigail was born in 3000 BCE
and very shortly after birth contracted an agonising and fatal disease. Nature and, thus, God tortured her to
death.
The sad
fate of Abigail creates more than a difficulty for any theodicy. There may be vast amounts of good in the
world and all the evil that we see may be necessary for that good. But none of the evil inflicted on Abigail is
necessary for good that accrues to Abigail.
There is little good for Abigail in her earthly life, certainly not
enough to outweigh the immense suffering.
Any good accruing to Abigail in the afterlife fails to defuse the evil
inflicted whilst she is on earth. An
eternity of bliss in heaven may more than “make up” for the comparatively short
period of pain on earth. But no period
of pain is necessary for any period of bliss in the afterlife.
The
evil inflicted on Abigail is logically inconsistent with a good God.
