What's so great about evidence?

I’ve just read a paper, Why Do We Value Knowledge? by Ward E.Jones, that poses the question: if we are concerned with truth, why bother with knowledge?  If knowledge is factive then all knowledge is true, but not all truths are known.  Why value a p which is known more than a p’ which is merely true?  Why do we, and it’s pretty evident that we do, think less of the lucky guesser as opposed to the knower?  Both have truth, both believe the proposition in question, the lucky guesser just lacks warrant, or justification, or reasons, or evidence for the proposition.  What’s so great about evidence?

Jones examines the instrumentalist answer to the question; that we value evidence (or warrant, or justification, or reasons...) because it is a means of getting true beliefs. As Jones points out that is a cracking explanation of why we like evidence but no explanation of why we like true beliefs brought about by evidence above those that we just happen upon.  An example from Jones is getting across a river.  We want to be on the other side and nice, safe, reliable method can be depended upon to get us there.  So we will use one. But the state of being on the other side is no sweeter because we got there by a safe and reliable method. 

My own way of putting it is this: we want money, in part, because it lets us buy beer.  But free beer is not valued any less.

Jones’s suggestion is to look at the incidental attributes of knowledge.  In order to get a robust definition of knowledge the concept has been pared down as far as possible, anything non-essential removed.  According to Jones, it may well be in this cloud of non-essential attributes of knowledge that its real value is found.

I think that there is a simpler and more straight-forward explanation.  We value neither truth nor knowledge.  Of course we will say that we value both, but our actions do not bear our statements out.  Rather like my saying that I am fond of a low fat, alcohol-free diet with plenty of exercise is not borne out by my sitting in a pub eating crisps and drinking beer.

Consider four propositions; e₁, e₂, g₃ and g₄. The “e” propositions have as much evidence (or warrant...) as you like whilst the “g” propositions are complete guesses. The odd numbered propositions, e₁ and g₃, are true.  The even numbered propositions, e₂ and g₄, are complete rubbish.  Our attitude to the propositions will be divided by evidence rather than truth.  We will think e₁ and e₂ are true, be inclined to believe them and consider them examples of knowledge.  Our attitude will not change dependent upon whether they are knowledge or whether they are true or false.  Similarly we will be wary of both g₃ and g₄, further investigate both the true and the false, deny both of them the title “knowledge” and be reluctant to believe them to be true.  Whilst we are avowedly all for truth and knowledge, dispositionally our attitudes track evidence.

We do not have access to the truth of propositions beyond the evidence we have for them. And so, the evidence we have for propositions stands as a proxy for truth, it is something we can aim our beliefs at and adjust our attitudes on the basis of. 

Now on the traditional view of knowledge, knowledge is evidenced, or warranted, or justified or reasoned true belief.  Where we have that evidence (or warrant...) we also believe the proposition to be true and, so, believe that all the ingredients of knowledge are there.  Where we do not have that evidence (or warrant...) we do not call our position in relation to the proposition “knowledge”.  Our attitude to propositions tracks our use of the term “knowledge” and, so, we believe that we favour knowledge when, in fact, we favour evidence.

Reference

Jones, W. E. (1997). Why Do We Value Knowledge? American Philosophical Quarterly , 34 (4), 423-439.

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The Efficacy of the Evidential Argument from Evil

After Stephen Law’s debate with William Lane Craig there was a lot of discussion on the web about the efficacy of Law’s argument, the Evidential Problem of Evil, in countering Craig’s arguments.

Many of those who think the Evidential Problem of Evil ineffective argue that it is a probabilistic argument that, at best, shows that God is unlikely. (e.g. Chab123 2011) Others (e.g. Stuart 2011) felt that insufficient attempt was made to show what was wrong with Craig’s arguments for God, especially the Kalam Cosmological Argument.

Craig’s opposing arguments for God are deductive arguments.  If the premises are true and the logic valid the conclusion is conclusively established:  it is simply impossible for the conclusion to be false. 

The best a “probabilistic” argument can do is make it very, very unlikely that the conclusion is false.  And, as Sherlock Holmes pointed out to Dr. Watson, no matter how unlikely a conclusion seems if nothing else is possible then it must be true.

This is Chab123’s complaint. Law claimed that the Evidential Argument from Evil, when plugged into the Modal Ontological Argument, demonstrated the impossibility of God:

“His confusion on this point is breath-taking. His evidential argument from evil, at its very best, shows, at most, that it is probable that God does not exist. The probability is less than 1. To defeat the ontological argument with an argument from evil, his argument would have to entail that God does not exist. The probability that God does not exist would have to be 1. It would have to prove, as he says, that the conclusion of Craig’s argument is false. But Law’s own argument, as a matter of logic alone, cannot achieve this goal. It is a probabilistic argument. As such, it leaves open the possibility that God exists, even if the probability is quite low.”

Nothing probabilistic about modus tolens

Craig’s arguments make use of a rule of logic called modus ponens.  The rule is:

1. If x then y
2. x
3. Thus y

The picture many people have of a “probabilistic” argument is along the lines of:

1. The first swan seen is white
2. The second swan seen is white
3. The third swan seen is white
4. …
5. The nth swan seen is white
6. Thus all swans are white

It can seem that the Evidential Problem of Evil follows this pattern.  Just as the first white swan is not enough to establish that all swans are white the first bit of gratuitous suffering is not enough to cast doubt on God.  The seemingly endless succession of uniformly white swans seems to make it likely that all swans are white and the endless widespread pointless suffering seems to make it likely that there is no God.

In fact not all swans are white, despite how overwhelmingly improbable that seemed before the discovery of Australia.  “y” in the example above, cannot be wrong, “all swans are white” both can be, and is. 

The Evidential Argument from Evil, though, is not a “probabilistic” argument.  It is just as deductive as Craig’s arguments; making use of a rule of logic called modus tolens.

Modus tolens runs:

1. If x then y
2. Not y
3. Thus not x

And the Evidential Problem of Evil runs like this:

1. If God existed then there wouldn’t be so much pointless suffering in the world
2. There is so much suffering in the world
3. Thus God does not exist.

This is just as “logically airtight” as any of Craig’s arguments; if the premises are accepted then the conclusion must be accepted.    We can, of course, dispute the premises (I am, though, persuaded by Law’s “evil god hypothesis” (Law 2009) that rejection of them would be irrational).  As for the comparison arguments from Craig: though in the above example of modus ponens the conclusion was absolutely certain, the premises were just assumed to be true and the logic was kept simple to ensure its validity.  Craig's premises, and the validity of his logic, are both at risk: they are not at all certain and that uncertainty carries through to the conclusion.

The idea that the Evidential Argument from Evil is a member of some poor-relation-species of argument compared to Craig’s is erroneous.

But you haven’t refuted Craig’s arguments!

The complaint that Law did not adequately argue against the Kalam Cosmological Argument is equally erroneous.

When criticising an argument we could “undermine” it: dispute the premises or find fault with the logic.  Or we could show it to be false. Law certainly did not explain why the Kalam Cosmological Argument concluded falsely but he did give a good argument that it does conclude incorrectly.

If the Kalam Cosmological Argument is a sound deductive argument then no evidence will count against its conclusion.  That evidence does count against its conclusion is good evidence that it’s not a sound deductive argument!   

Similarly, with the Modal Ontological Argument.  This, very briefly, assumes the possibility of God and concludes with His existence.  If one accepts the logic of the argument (I don’t) then, far from showing “breath-taking” confusion Law’s claim is perfectly cogent:

1. If God is possible then God exists (Modal Ontological Argument)
2. God does not exist (Evidential Argument from Evil)
3. Thus God is not possible

Of course we would like to know where the argument falls down, knowing where the argument falls down may expand our knowledge and that knowledge may help us avoid error in future arguments.  But look at this, readily criticised, argument:

1. All elephants are pink
2. Socrates is an elephant
3. Socrates is mortal

The “logic” is hardly worthy of the name, the premises are junk but the conclusion is true.  A demonstration of the falsity of the premises or the invalidity of the logic does not establish that the conclusion is false; a demonstration of the falsity of the conclusion, obviously, does.

The Evidential Argument from Evil is a better counter argument than picking holes in Craig's logic and questioning his premises.  Whilst direct criticisms of Craig's arguments may cast doubt on those arguments the Evidential Problem of Evil shows them to be false.

Bibliography

Craig, W. L. (2010, February 4). Five Arguments for God. Retrieved February 8, 2012, from The Gospel Coalition: http://thegospelcoalition.org/publications/cci/five_arguments_for_god/


chab123 (2011, October 24) The Missing Ontological Argument in the Craig vs. Law Debate. Retreived February 13, 2012, from Ratio Christi-at The Ohio State University:
http://chab123.wordpress.com/2011/10/24/the-missing-ontological-argument-in-the-craig-vs-law-debate/

Stuart (2011, October 20). How Stephen Law Failed in His Debate with William Lane Craig. Retrieved February 13, 2012, from THINKINGmatters:

http://thinkingmatters.org.nz/2011/10/ho-stephen-law-failed-in-his-debate-with-william-lane-craig/

Law (2009, November 30) Draft of PART of chpt 3. VSI Humanism. Retrieved February 13, 2012, from Stephen Law (blog):

http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2009/11/draft-of-part-of-chpt-3-vsi-humanism.html

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William Lane Craig's Premises and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

William Lane Craig seeks to put forward deductive arguments for the existence of God.  

If Craig gets his logic right he will have produced a valid deductive argument. If an argument is valid then if the premises are true the conclusion is true.  Validity is not enough though,  Pooh's argument here is valid:

"And if anyone knows anything about anything," said Bear to himself "it's Owl who knows something about something," he said, "or my name's not Winnie the Pooh," he said. "Which it is," he added. "So there you are." (Milne, 1977)

We can only be sure of the truth of the conclusion if the argument is valid and we are sure of the truth of the premises.  Now Craig cannot, none of us can, establish the truth of his premises beyond doubt.  What he seeks to do is adopt premises that are “more plausible than their negations” (2010) 


This is problematical.  Accepting that the premise adopted is more plausible than its negation may lead the reader, or debate attendee, to believe that the premise adopted is the most plausible premise.  Were the only options to be that premise and its negation this would be the case.  Take, however the Kalam Cosmological Argument:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.2. The universe began to exist.3. Therefore, the universe has a cause(Craig 2010)

Other premises

There are a number of alternative first premises other than "not everything that begins to exist has a cause", each with good arguments for its adoption:

Alternate A: Not everything has a cause

Argument for: We might consider that "everything has a cause".  However causes happen before effects, meaning that each effect has a predecessor.  As each cause is "something" and requires it's own cause, a cause which also requires a cause further back.  The regress, if everything had a cause, would never terminate.  There are good arguments for this being impossible: meaning that as there is something not everything had a cause. (Note, for later, that if an effect can precede a cause or be simultaneous with its cause there is no obstacle to everything having a cause")

Alternate B: Everything we can understand has a cause

Argument for: Though we speculate about entities we don't understand we shouldn't introduce that speculation into a deductive argument as, well, we don't understand them.  We can confidently say that anything comprehensible has a cause as causality is part of the way that we understand things.

Alternate C: For any X : if a Plank second of time occurred before X's existence then X had a cause.

Argument for: Again, causes happen before effects.  It appears that a Plank second is the shortest period of time any cause can be before its effect.  For any effect, therefore, there has to be at least one Plank second before it for its cause to be in.  

There we have three alternatives to the first premise given by Craig.  

Whilst it is difficult (probably impossible) to quantify plausibility, each of the alternatives appears to be at least as plausible as the premise given by Craig.  It would be difficult to argue that together they are not considerably more plausible than the premise given by Craig.  To argue that they were not more plausible would require arguing that:

"Alternate A or Alternate B or Alternate C" is more plausible than "Craig's first premise" 

Now "Alternate A or Alternate B or Alternate C" fails to establish the conclusion "the universe had a cause", whilst Craig's first premise does.  But  "Alternate A or Alternate B or Alternate C" is more plausible than Craig's first premise.  Limit our choice to these alternatives and the following is true:

The most plausible conclusion is that Craig's conclusion has not been established

What Craig is arguing for.

Supposing we come to the debate holding Alternate C.  What must Craig show in order to establish his contention that the universe had a cause?  Some of our position (Alternate C) and Craig's overlap, its just that that part of Craig's position fails to establish his conclusion.  What Craig needs to convince us of is the difference between his first premise and ours.  What is that difference? We already agree that all stars, all planets, all living things, all atoms and sub atomic particles, all light and, if they exist, all dark matter and dark energy have causes.  We accept that everything arising since the first Plank second of the universe's existence  had a cause.  

Our dispute is about the first Plank second of the universe.

And what is the first Plank second of the universe's existence?  Is it anything more than the beginning of the universe?  Is there anything else to attribute a cause to other than "the universe"?  In order to persuade us to accept his premise over ours does Craig not have to persuade us that the universe had a cause?  In other words, to establish that the universe has a cause he first has to establish that the universe has a cause in order to establish his premise that everything that began to exist had a cause. 

And what does he have to do to establish this?  He has to persuade us that the universe had a cause even though there was no time for the cause to be in.  If he succeeds in doing that he must either allow simultaneous causes (which allows us to curtail the infinite regress mentioned in Alternate A, which allows "everything has a cause") or exempt the universe from this rule.  If we can exempt the universe from the rule to have a prior cause we can just as well exempt the universe from having a cause.  

Conclusion

It is the dichotomy created by the "more plausible than its negation" that allows other, more plausible, alternatives to be ignored and Craig's need to argue for a cause of the universe tout court to remain hidden. It's the dichotomy which allows a startlingly implausible argument to look plausible.

Craig, W. L. (2010, February 4). Five Arguments for God. Retrieved February 8, 2012, from The Gospel Coalition: http://thegospelcoalition.org/publications/cci/five_arguments_for_god/

Milne, A. A. (1977). Winnie the Pooh. New York: Dell Pub. Co.

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“Modal Ontological Arguments” and meta-modality

In which I find that the Modal Ontological Argument "works" because Modal Logic languages cannot cope with modalities about modalities.  I fix that.

Like its non-modal counterpart, Anslem’s plain old “Ontological Argument”, the Modal Onotological Argument can be maddening.  Whilst both seem obviously fallacious it is not at all obvious where the fallacy lies.  Is it a parlour trick?  If so, where is the sleight?

The argument seems to commence with the assumption that God possibly exists.  Then with no further assumptions than conventional modal logic, the argument concludes that God actually exists.  The assumption that God possibly exists seems innocuous enough, the claim that God actually exists is a little more contentious.  As the only bridge between the two is modal logic it suggests that the fault lies there.

That there is a fault can be shown by running the argument for other entities we are quite sure do not exist but will accept that they could possibly exist; such as  The Golden Mountain, the Flying Spaghetti Monster or the Decent Pint of Mass Produced Lager. 

A version by William Lane Craig, itself a slightly reworded version of Alvin Plantinga’s “victorious” argument, goes like this:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

(Craig, 2010)  (Plantinga, 1974, p.214-217)

Possible Worlds

Modal logic is expressed both formally in symbolic language and less formally in everyday language.  In everyday language the modal statements are expressed by means of statements about “possible worlds”, complete and discrete descriptions of the way the world could be.  If p is possible there will be a complete and discrete description of the way the world could be that contains p: p will “exist in” a “possible world”.

If p is necessary then every description of the way the world could be will include p: p will exist in all possible worlds.  “Impossible” can be expressed by absence from all possible worlds.  “Actual” involves existence in one, special, possible world: the actual world. (As the actual world is such a special world it deserves its own name and we shall follow Plantinga in calling it “Kronos”).

“It is possible that a maximally great being exists”

A “maximally great being” takes the place of God in the argument.  “Maximal greatness” is “maximal excellence” in every possible world.  “Maximal excellence” is the collection of those God-like properties of omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection (“OOM”). 

The “being” is mentioned partly because this is an argument about a being, God, but mostly to avoid issues of trans-world identity.  OOM are attributes of beings or nothing at all.  If OOM exists in a possible world then a being exists in that world to possess them.  The existence of OOM entails a being but the existence of OOM in more than one world does not entail the same being in each one.  The disadvantage in talking about OOM rather than a specific OOM being is that you might prove that a god is in each possible world without showing that God is in each possible world.  The advantage of discussing OOM alone is that it makes the discussion that follows a lot simpler.  So long as we undertake not to introduce a trans-world-identity sleight, no one should mind us simplifying matters by talking directly of OOM.

There is a claim of OOM qualified by the modality, necessity, conferred by OOM being subsumed in “maximally greatness”.  There is also a qualification by possibility. 

What does the “possible” qualify, what is its range?  The range of the necessity is clear: OOM.  But does “possible” range over OOM or over “necessary OOM”?

If “possible” ranges over OOM there is a claim that OOM is possible.  There is also, clearly, a claim of necessary OOM.  Two claims about OOM are made and the modal claims of the first premise can be re-phrased:

1a. OOM is possible and necessary

Expressing this in terms of possible worlds is simple: OOM is in all of them. 

The alternate reading is that the “possible” qualifies the necessity of OOM (call that “OOM*”):

            1b. OOM* is possible

It is much more difficult to express just what the modal claim is here.  The modality of OOM* is not the modality of OOM; a claim that OOM* is possible is not a claim that OOM is possible.  For example, let p be a plainly contingent entity; such as the piece of paper or the screen you are reading this on.  Let p* be the claim that p is necessary. p* is plainly impossible, p is a contingent entity and contingent entities are not necessary.  p, though, is plainly possible: if it exists, it exists in Kronos, which is a possible world, so it's possible.

Extending the language

Expressing these modalities of modalities within the language of possible worlds sketched out above is more than tricky, it may require an extension of that language.  The possible worlds we are used to for speaking of modalities are populated by actuals.    A possible p is actually in a possible world.  To talk about the modality not of an actual but of a modality, to talk meta-modally, somewhere populated by modalities is required. 

Modalities populate the set of possible worlds.

Now the language of possible worlds requires, in a way, complete description of all possible worlds.  We need the full set of possible worlds to “look into” to check whether p is present in all, some or none.  So, when asked whether p is possible we rustle up the full set of possible worlds, “S₁”, and have a look.

But S₁ may be wrong, it may not be the set of possible worlds, just a set of worlds that could be the set of possible worlds.  We have imagined a possible set of possible worlds, a set in which the modality of p resides but only possibly. 

The full set of sets of possible worlds is where modalities of modalities reside.

- To say that X is possibly [a particular modality] is to say that in at least one set of possible worlds X has that modality.

- To say that X is necessarily [a particular modality] is to say that in all sets of possible worlds X has that modality

- To say that X is impossibly [a particular modality] is to say that X has that modality in no sets of possible worlds

- To say that X is actually [a particular modality] is to say that X has that modality in the actual set of possible worlds (meta-Kronos).

           

Extending symbolic modal systems

To express this formally we need to distinguish modalities and meta-modalities.  We shall add subscripts to the modal operators, □ (necessity) and ◊ (possibility). An operator that is not subscripted is taken to be subscripted with zero.

We need to make clear the range of the meta-modalities.  This we shall do by restricting the permissible expressions in the extended language, "well formed formulae" or "wff".  We shall introduce two rules:

1. A wff in whichever “standard” modal logic we are extending is a wff.

2. A wff enclosed in brackets with a modal operator to the left with a subscript one higher than the highest subscripted operator within the brackets is a wff.

Finally we need to be able to work on a modal statement unencumbered by the meta-modality, to figure out what we are qualifying before applying the meta-logic.  We shall add a new argumentation rule, the "detachment/re-attachment rule":

- On a line in an argument the operators with the highest subscript may be removed ("detachment")

- If the operators are detached they must be reintroduced on a later line to form a wff ("attachement")

- When attached the operators are given the lowest subscript then available.

The confusion in the argument

We can now clearly distinguish three different readings of the first premise.  We can express them both formally and in the more everyday language of possible worlds. Our opening position clear we can proceed to argue modally.

The first reading, 1a: OOM is possible and necessary, is expressible in the non-extended language.  OOM is in all possible worlds and every possible world.  As it is in all possible worlds, it is in Kronos.  Therefore OOM exists.

Formally:

1.      ◊OOM & □OOM (Premise)

2.      □x → x (Axiom)

3.      □OOM (1 Elimination)

4.      OOM (2,3)

The second reading, 1b: possibly OOM*, requires the extensions to the languages.  OOM*, the necessity of OOM, entails the presence of OOM in each world in a set of possible worlds.  In that set of possible worlds OOM will be in Kronos and will, therefore, exist.  OOM is actually exisiting in at least one possible set of possible worlds and is, thus, possibly existing.

Formally:

1.      ◊₁(□OOM) (Premise)

2.      □x → x (Axiom)

3.      □OOM (Detachment)

4.      OOM (2,3)

5.      ◊OOM (Attachment)

A third reading, not mentioned above, is the meaning someone probably “hears” on first encountering the argument:

1c  God is possible

In the language of possible worlds, God is in at least one possible world.  So God is possible. 

Formally:

1.      ◊G (Premise and conclusion)

Notice how 1b reaches the same conclusion as the premise that is “heard” and which will be readily agreed.  The unextended languages, though, are unable to adequately express 1b.  As a result any formalisation, “full” or “everyday language”,   is forced onto 1a, or similar.  1a naturally reaches the conclusion of the Modal Ontological Argument but, if made clear would not be assented to by atheists, agnostics and, even, many theists.

==Update==
There's a nice little Evil-God Modal Ontological Argument here.

Bibliography

Craig, W. L. (2010, February 4). Five Arguments for God. Retrieved February 8, 2012, from The Gospel Coalition: http://thegospelcoalition.org/publications/cci/five_arguments_for_god/

Plantinga, A. (1974). The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Contra Hill and Harman

Dave Hill in the Guardian complains at the refusal of those in authority to even consider the causes of the riots:

"Michael Gove's performance on Newsnight was definitive. Fellow guest Harriet Harman's mild observation that the causes of the riots are "complex" produced a barked tirade of rigid sanctimony - the first refuge of the right in denial"

Dave Hill's, necessary, shortening of the argument misses some detail. Harman didn't just say that the causes were "complex" but advanced her ideas on what some of those "complex" causes were. Student Fees were an issue, together with Education Maintenance Allowance. She was careful to say that they did not "justify" the rioting.


So Harriet Harman was genuinely trying to figure out the ultimate causes of the riots.


Was she bollocks.


Amazing, isn't it, that amongst the causes of the riots were following Coalition policy and not following Labour policy? Not, entirely amazing. Mad Mel thinks that the riots were caused by being liberal and thinking too hard about stuff, more reactionary garbage is the cure. Nick Griffin thinks that the riots are a result of "multi-culturalism" (a codeword used by many in the racist community to mean "Blacks, Asians and Jews") and not following BNP policy (get rid of Blacks, Asians and Jews). Others think that the riots happened because of "soft" sentences and a lack of flogging.


Notice a pattern? Of course you do the "causes" of the riots are always too much "stuff I don't like", coupled with a lack of "stuff I do like".


This is hardly a "clear-eyed, realistic, intelligent diagnos(is)". It's a trick even Nick-fucking-Griffin can pull!


But this wasn't Gove's key objection. Gove's key objection was that, despite saying these causes didn't "justify" the riots Harman "relativised" the riots. I don't think "relativised" is a good word for what Harman did. But I do think he was right.


There are a huge number of (partial) causes for any event. When asked for the cause we almost never give it, the cause usually doesn't exists. Why am I late home from work? Well part of the reason is where I live and where my work is: were I to live next door to the office I would not have been late. Neither would I have been late if I could teleport. Of course I wouldn't be late home from work at all if I didn't go out to work. That is the product of a whole separate set of causes.


What we do is give the cause we think is the one we should concentrate on. One that we can change. One that, itself has "ultimate" causes we can influence. One that we should change.

I am late home from work because I went for a drink.

It's true that I work in a certain place, it is true that I can't teleport and it is true that I do go out to work. But I can't change where my work is, I can't learn to teleport and I shouldn't consider (for just this reason) stopping work. Those causes are "givens", we choose the key factor, my love of Real Ale.


My being late home from work is not really disastrous. Let's look at a couple of different choices of the cause.

Event 1: Man M1 rapes woman W1.
The cause 1: M1 is the sort of violent misogynistic scum who would do such a thing.
The cause 2: W1 wore a short skirt and dressed in a "provocative manner"


Event 2: Man M2 beats woman W2.
The cause 1: M2 is the sort of violent misogynistic scum who would do such a thing.
The cause 2: W1 did not have M2's dinner ready when he got home


How do those second causes sound to you?


Given that M1 would not have raped W1 had W1 not dressed in a "provactive manner" and that M2 would not have hit W2 had he had his dinner they are part of the causal history of the act. But they're hardly the thing we should be concentrating on. To even mention them sounds a lot like blaming the victim.


As it does with the riots.


Sometimes a demonstration can get out of hand, sometimes there is a genuine grievance (racist policing, totalitarian governments etc) that provoke riots amongst decent people. We all know, though, that last week wasn't a demonstration that got out of hand, we all know this wasn't a reaction to racist policing or totalitarian goverment. The rioters rioted for a reason similar to why the rapist rapes and the wife-beater wife beats: they are violent, thieving criminals.


There is your cause. The cause.


And if we want to look at "underlying" causes we can consider:
1. What caused them to be violent, thieving criminals and how we can reduce the numbers of other people becoming violent, thieving criminals
2. What keeps them being violent, thieving criminals and whether they can be reformed.
3. Given there will always be violent, thieving criminals, how we can reduce the adverse impact of violent, thieving criminals on the rest of us.


Just as we consider what causes people to be/remain rapists and wife beaters, whether they can be reformed and how to reduce their adverse impact. When people rape and beat we do not divert attention to some, morally, irrelevant "cause".


Imagine Harman's reaction if we did. Imagine the "provocative dress" and late dinner being suggested to Harman as part of the complex of causes for rape and wife beating. Imagine whoever was advancing them (some "Bufton Tufton" backbench Tory) was careful to say that these reasons in no way "justified" the actions of M1 and M2. Imagine Richard Littlejohn writing:

"[Harriet Harman]'s performance on Newsnight was definitive. Fellow guest [Bufton Tufton]'s mild observation that the causes of [rape] are "complex" produced a barked tirade of rigid sanctimony - the first refuge of the [left] in denial"

Now tell me you can't imagine exactly those two sentences and that you can't imagine Dave Hill being utterly appalled by them. Harman showed her intellectual rigour to be on a par with Nick Griffin and moral percipacity to be on a par with Richard Littlejohn.


Gove was right to bark a tirade in her direction and Hill showed either special pleading or a lack of self knowledge to criticise him for it.

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The Joys of Regicide

The revolution is won.

The spark that set it off, of course, was the revelations of tapping (and interfering with) Milly Dowler’s voicemail. People were outraged.

People were so outraged that both News Corp and Parliament lost control of events. And because Parliament could no longer control events it couldn’t, even if it wanted to, support the News Corp cause. All the bad things that would come from defying News Corp were going to come anyway or had already happened. You can't "out" Chris Bryant twice. All the good things that come from bowing to News Corp were lost anyway. Cameron was never going to get another Obama style poster on the front page of The Sun

Parliament had nothing to lose.

It must have felt good.

And if you’ve got nothing to lose in standing up to a bully, the chances are that the bully is going to get it good.

So, right now, the Prime Minister and prospective Prime Ministers no longer abase themselves before News Corp. There is no question of anyone promising to weaken the BBC to help BSkyB (as Cameron was alleged to have done). There is no question of a Prime Minister needing to defend his European policy to Rupert Murdoch (Blair). Murdoch no longer claims the right to be consulted, Cameron’s aids laughed at the idea that the Prime Minister might condescend to meet Murdoch.

This is how it should be: News Corp is no longer a de facto part of the UK Constitution. We have had a sudden and dramatic change in Constitution: a revolution.

Much was the same situation in 1789 Paris and 1381 London. The French citizens were running their own affairs and the English peasants had removed the Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer and were wandering at will through the capital. Both revolutions appeared to have succeeded.

One did, one didn’t. After the revolution had been won the French killed the king, to secure the revolution. The English peasants were presented with the opportunity of doing the same. The English balked and were robbed of all the revolutionary changes.

It was the people wot won it. It was the regicides wot kept it.

Fortunately, in this day and age, we don’t need to actually kill anyone. Not the least reason is that the person we need to be shot off is a corporation: News Corp. But if we are to keep these revolutionary gains we need to remove News Corp from our country.

- Dropping the BSkyB bid is a delay, not a cancellation
- The News of the World looks likely to be reborn, with much the same staff and much the same corporate culture, as the Sun on Sunday
- The 39% stake in BSkyB is still there
- The Times, Sunday Times and The Sun are still owned and controlled by News Corp.

They will be back.

Unless, of course, we kill the King : force News Corp to divest itself of all its UK interests.

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Vive la revolution!

What’s the difference between a riot, a popular movement or a demonstration on the one hand and a revolution on the other?

A riot, popular movement and a demonstration may change government policy or a law. Poll tax riots at least helped to end the poll tax and the gay rights movement has nearly got gay marriage legalised (it has got gay nearly-marriage legalised).

A revolution changes a constitution: the permanent environment within which public affairs, whether to have a poll tax or let gays marry, are conducted. The French chopped off the King’s head and transformed France into a republic: that counts as a revolution. East Germany didn’t have to chop anyone’s head off, they just went through some wall, had a few beers and “bingo!” they were part of a democracy. That still counts as a revolution as it transformed the constitution.

Now, the constitution is not only important, in public affairs the constitution is of overwhelming importance. The UK is, in general, a nice place to live. North Korea is, in general, a hell hole. The UK is a liberal democracy (small “l”) and, as can be seen by a quick mental survey of other reasonably nice places to live, liberal democracies generally are reasonably nice places to live. The example of places that were not nice places to live, Nazi Germany, fascist Spain and others, that now are reasonably nice places to live suggests that liberal democracies are reasonably nice places to live because they are liberal democracies.

Over longer timescales we can see that feudal corporate countries were not such nice places to live as liberal democratic nation states. Medieval France and Medieval England were places of servitude and cruelty, utterly inegalitarian and culturally repressed. Whilst modern day France and England are by no means perfect (especially France, obviously) they are paradise by comparison. Let’s get this straight: the increase in VAT to 20%, “THE CUTS!!!!” or student fees are temporary. Constitutional changes, universal suffrage, equality before the law, the secret ballot have permanent and deep effects on every citizen’s life.

The UK, as above, is a reasonably nice place to live and a big part of that is that we have a good constitution. We have a representative democracy, with a more-or-less independent judiciary and respect (sort of) by our rulers for the rule of law. Officiallywe have a Queen, actually her role is mainly ceremonial and just looks as though it’s a part of the old feudal set up. Officially the media have no role in the UK’s constitution. Actually one particular media organisation, News Corp., has become part of how public affairs are organised in the UK. Not just taking part in public affairs, many groups do that, but that there have arisen obligations on the part of others in public affairs to News Corp. Just as the government may be over-ruled by judges and Commons legislation is subject to amendment in the Lords the government is subject to oversight by News Corp. This is oversight, we all suggest things the government should do and anyone is entitled to suggest or campaign, with News Corp. there is a duty on the part of the government to take News Corp. wishes into account.

The Daily Telegraph quotes “a senior News International figure” on the first meetings of Cameron with Murdoch:

“We told David exactly what to say and how to say it in order to please Rupert. But Cameron wouldn’t play ball. I can’t understand it.”

There is a duty to please Rupert Murdoch. It makes sense to tell someone what to say to Rupert. You’re supposed to do as you’re told, to do otherwise is incomprehensible.

News Corp. have insinuated themselves into the very constitution of the UK. And how do they do this? We know that they made money by illegal means. To protect this they followed classic Mafia strategy: they paid off police officers and kept politicians in their pocket. News Corp. are part of our constitution and they are a foul and pestilent part of that constitution: the robber baron of the corporate feudalism we thought we had left behind. But they’re in there, and it seems as if only a revolution is going to get them out.

Revolutions usually start when “something snaps”. The causes will have been there for years, perhaps decades, perhaps centuries but suddenly something pushes the populace over an undefined limit. Revolutions often start small, they often don’t look like revolutions and don’t start as revolutions but, somehow, gain their own momentum. An isolated incident starts it off and initial successes feed the populace’s confidence. The power of the elite, which depends on the populace’s lack of confidence, teeters and falls.

‘Phone hacking and, more broadly, the excesses of the tabloid press have been with us for decades. The hacking of Milly Dowler’s ‘phone was just another, all-be-it spectacularly foul, incident of press lawlessness. But something in the populace seemed to give: the outrage was immense, such that advertisers dropped out, such that the News Corp. lie of “one rogue reporter” failed to work. News Corp seem now to be pushing the “one rogue title” line with the closure of the News of the World. But will it work? It’s a confidence trick, confidence tricks rely on confidence and the public’s confidence in a denial from News Corp. has disappeared. We may well be seeing the start of a revolution.

Protean revolutions though, can peter out. If this revolution is not to peter out it the rage of the public must be used for constitutional change. How does News Corp. push itself into our constitution? What would stop it doing so? That is what should be attacked. Unfortunately, much of the public rage is being used to attack Coulson and Brooks. But this is not revolutionary, that’s like the peasants in the Peasants Revolt being satisfied with policy promises (later renaged on) rather than shooting the King. In the case of Coulson, and the decision to appoint him to Number 10, this is in the past. We will gain nothing by concentrating on Coulson. Brooks is still in the job, but she’s a side issue: a hate figure whose demise will help appease the masses (just like the Peasants Revolt again).

Change the constitution, remove the means by which News Corp. Exercises power. Those bent coppers are more important than either Coulson or Brooks. Those coppers who may not be bent, but acted as is they might as well have been (Yates, anyone?) are more important than Coulson or Brooks. Get rid of them.

And then there are the politicians. We all know that they have been running scared of News Corp. Other than the Lib Dems (big “L”), Tom Watson, John Prescott, Chris Bryant and a few others they have all been running scared. Or, to be more exact, have been following their constitutional duty not to upset Rupert. Some though have not just been submitting to News Corp. but actively promoting its interests. They may not be shills per se, but they might as well be shills. These are the supporters of the ancien regime, these are the people it is critical that the energy of any revolution is targeted at.

Forget Coulson and Brooks: get Hunt and Gove and Osborne. Give them, by all means, an opportunity to renounce News Corp. and reform. But if they refuse, remove them, guillotine their careers. Yes Ed, call for an inquiry. It's pretty obvious that we should stop the News Corp. BSkyB bid and, yes, it was a silly appointment. But cooperate, Ed, cooperate with Cameron on the condition that he purges his Government of anyone pro-Murdoch. Do the same with your party, ditch them. Disown Blair.

Nick! Grow a pair. Take control. Talk to Ed. Talk to the rest of the Commons. Oh, and Commons! Yes I'm talking to you, forget about scoring some little point against the opposition and get rid of any Murdoch supporters. Get them out and get him the hell out of our country.

Vive la revolution!

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