There are exactly one hundred diners who use the works canteen for a nice, healthy, lunch that involves fruit. Only one fruit is served. That fruit is served each and every day for four to five years. Why do the canteen management arrange things in this way? Is it because it’s more efficient? Does it save money? Is it because of some weird dietary theory? Or is it that I need to mirror the choice of one representative in a parliament that will last four to five years? Probably the last. Whilst the diners won’t have a choice of fruit each day and will never have an individual choice of fruit, the canteen management are responsive enough to allow them to collectively decide on the fruit once every four or five years.
There’s a fruit election with apple, banana, cherry and durian as the candidates.
Judging the outcome of the election
We’re going to look at the outcome of the election under First Past the Post (FPTP) and Alternative Vote (AV) and judge which system leaves the diners best off.
The principles in judging the outcome are:
1. If your favourite fruit is chosen then you are best off.
2. If a fruit that you like is chosen in preference to a fruit that you like less then you are better of than you would have been had the other fruit been chosen.
3. if you're “best off” you're also “better off”
4. If you are not better off then you are worse off
So, say you want banana. If banana is chosen, then you are best off. If cherry is chosen and you prefer that to apple then you are better off than you would have been were apple chosen. If apple is chosen and you prefer apple to durian, but prefer cherry and banana to apple, then you are better off than had durian been chosen, but worse of than if banana or cherry had been chosen.
Under AV the diners list the fruit in order of preference, under FPTP they just list one: the first in their AV list.
The outcome
Durian is reputed to taste absolutely delicious and smell utterly disgusting. I’ve found that a bit of an exaggeration (it tastes quite nice and pongs a bit), but it is a fruit that divides opinion. Some are passionately for it, some equally passionately against it. The same cannot be said for other fruits. I don’t particularly like apples but, if push comes to shove, I’ll eat one and am not going to ban you from even taking an apple near me (seriously – durian is banned from many hotels and public places in the Far East). If people don’t put durian down first, then they’re likely to put it down last. Durian is likely to get very, very few second preferences under AV. That said, people who like durian tend to be very enthusiastic about it. If they like it then they like it way more than other fruits. Durian is likely to get a lot of first preferences, under AV, and votes, under FPTP.
So let’s assume that durian gets most votes under FPTP and most first preferences under AV.
The outcome of the election under FPTP is that durian gets chosen. Under AV durian may get chosen. If more than 50 people listed durian as first preference then durian does get chosen.
If less than 50 people choose durian then the fruit with least votes gets eliminated. The diners who voted for that fruit are now counted as having voted for their second preference. If there is still no majority the fruit with the least votes gets eliminated and the votes of the diners counted against that fruit are re-assigned.
Let’s say that apple got eliminated first, then cherry and the count now shows banana and durian with the final tally of votes as follows:
Banana
First preferences - 30
Second prefs, from apple - 7
Second prefs from cherry - 17
Third prefs from apple – 5
Total - 59
Durian
First preferences - 35
Second prefs, from apple - 3
Second prefs from cherry - 3
Total - 41
Banana gets chosen under AV, whereas durian gets chosen under FPTP.
Which leaves the diners better off?
Those who put banana first preference are best off under AV. Those who put banana second preference put either apple or cherry first (they wouldn't have been counted for second preference had they put durian as first preference). So they prefer banana to durian and, so, are better off under AV.
Those who put banana third preference did so because they chose cherry second preference (and apple first). Even though banana is low down on their list of preferences, banana is still higher on that list than durian (otherwise that third preference would be listed under durian).
Each of the groups of diners in the banana column is better off for banana being chosen against durian. Each of them would be worse off were durian to be chosen. And there is a majority of them. The outcome of AV (banana) leaves a majority of the diners better off than the outcome of FPTP (durian).
The same ranking of outcomes can be applied to elections of MPs. There is something “better” about your second choice candidate being elected as opposed to your third choice; even if “better off” might sound a bit awkward. Perhaps “better represented” is term to use. And, contra other arguments against AV, even your sixth or seventh preference candidate better represents you, and is a better outcome for you, than your eighth or ninth.
There are scenarios where AV does not ensure an optimal outcome. But in these situations, neither does FPTP. Where FPTP differs in outcome from AV, AV ensures a majority of the electorate have a better selection than under FP.
There are lots of arguments against AV other than the democracy of the outcomes in individual cases.
AV helps extremists, like the BNP, for eample.
Only it doesn't, if it did then the BNP wouldn't be so opposed to it. But there are still some good arguments. Like:
AV is complex and expensive to count.
But then I've counted AV and, actually, it's a piece of cake. And, as Eddie Izzard pointed out, the main additional cost is in pencil lead. Ok. So those two were bad examples, but there are good arguments for FPTP over AV other than the outcomes in individual constituencies. The point of this post was that that particular argument was bogus, regardless of any merit of any other argument. Like:
AV counts losers votes twice.
But no, look at the example above. 100 diners, 100 votes in the final tally. Oh well. There must be some good arguments for FPTP over AV.....
Monday, 4 April 2011
The Durian Candidacy - or why AV is more democratic than FPTP
Tuesday, 2 November 2010
Verisimilitude Draft for Comments
Classically a statement is either true or false, there's no in between. The idea that something can be nearly, somewhat or a little true, like the truth even if false is something that seems obvious. Saying just what it is for a statement to be "like the truth" is, though, a bit of a bugger.
Monday, 4 October 2010
Bogus Primitives, Customer Services and menaces
Some things just are.
Further analysis of some concepts is an academic pursuit, possibly valuable and interesting, but only tangentially connected to the real world. “Colour” is such a concept. If you say that an object is coloured you may be asked which colour it is, whether it’s solid or patterned or dark or light. You won’t be asked to explain colour per se. You can lie about the object, “this glass is coloured”. You can hallucinate, you can have a set of sense impressions that entail that the glass is coloured. There is a sense, though, in which you cannot be mistaken about the concept of colour. If you have a set of sense impressions that the glass is coloured then you have a set of sense impressions that the glass is coloured. If anything is wrong it’s your impressions not your concept of colour.
Other things are dependent
“A painting” is not a primitive, we can further analyse the concept of “painting”. A painting is an arrangement of coloured stuff designed to look in some particular way. Some of this analysis can be further analysed, some can’t. “Coloured”, we have already seen is primitive. “Stuff”, in this context, is primitive. Arrangement is not. We can talk of the purpose of an arrangement, the spatial relations of the arrangement etc. Notice, though, that where we can further analyse we reach a point where we get to a primitive concept. Notice also that if we don’t then we “lose” the concept. A painting that is not made of coloured stuff that has been purposefully set in spatial relations is simply not a painting.
On a more abstract level a concept that doesn’t analyse down to some primitives is an empty concept. Just as atoms are the “stuff” of matter, primitives are the “stuff” of concepts. A non-primitive concept that cannot be further analysed is simply meaningless.
You can also be wrong about a non-primitive concept in a way that you cannot with a primitive concept. You may think a chance pattern, lacking purpose, is a painting. Or you may mistake a reflection, lacking stuff, for a painting. For this reason reasonable disputes tend to be about non-primitive concepts.
Bogus primitives
If, in “real life”, you start trying to analyse a primitive then you really are being pedantic. To dispute someone’s use of a primitive, in “real life” again, you near-enough have to accuse them of dishonesty or mental illness. So people can get away with an empty or incorrect claim by pretending that it is a claim about a primitive.
Now sometimes it is perfectly acceptable to treat a non-primitive concept as primitive. Where any disagreement about the concept must be due only to dishonesty or mental illness, where operationally there is no difference, then we may as well act as if it were primitive. We all know what we mean by “a painting” and, say in a court of law, we are just going to accept someone’s testimony that they saw a painting. This leads onto a second problem. There is no question that something is (insert primitive here) but one can be wrong about something that is non-primitive. To discover your mistake with a non-primitive concept you need to do some analysis of that concept. What is (insert non-primitive here)? Does what I am considering have that? If you treat the concept as primitive you may not just get the concept wrong, but you miss the question you need to discover that fact.
Empty and incorrect
@RichardWiseman tweeted:
PC World have the worst customer service dept I have ever encountered. I vow never to buy anything else from them. Just saying.
What is this “service”? Can we further analyse it? Of course we can. A “service” is an action, by somebody else, that we want done. Companies “offer” services, PC world offer:
- Selling us computers
- Setting up computers
- Repairing computers
From the words “customer service dept” it would appear that PC World have a separate department charged with doing these services. But the “customer service department” doesn’t sell computers, set them up or repair them. Different departments sell them, set them up and repair them.
So what is the service that the “customer service dept” does? What is the action that we want doing that they do? What do we get if we try and further analyse the service? We get what we would get if we asked “what do you mean by “coloured”?”: either a restatement of “customer services” in slightly different words or blank incomprehension. “Service” in “customer service dept” is treated as a primitive when “service” is not a primitive. “Customer service” is meaningless, it does not exist. There is no service that a customer service department provides.
The purpose of a Customer Service Dept is to build up the claim that a company has customer services with no relation whatsoever to actually providing them.
Wrong, because you failed to notice the question
Can “menacing” be further analysed or is “menacing” a primitive? The gerund gives the game away: to be “menacing” something must have a tendency to menace. “Menace” may be primitive: “menacing” is not. Now is the following menancing?
Crap! Robin Hood Airport is closed. You’ve got a week and a bit to get your shit together, otherwise I’m blowing the airport sky high!
Don't answer that! Just think what type of things would help answer that or not. Just think that there are things that will help answer it or not. "Menacing" is not a primitive concept that just either is or isn't present in a tweet. But the judge in the Paul Chambers case treated it as just such a primitive concept. The judge failed to give any analysis of "menacing", and analsysis which would have shown what the prosecution needed to demonstrate to establish that the tweet was menacing. Instead the judge took his own impressions as correct, "is it menacing? Yup.", in the same way as he would establish a promitive: "is is coloured? Yup."
Much modern discourse is characterised by an appeal to bogus-primitives. "Respect", "reasonable", "progressive", "regressive", "excellent customer service", "efficiency", "evidence" are all words thoroughly abused with their meanings horribly distorted but the fact of that distortion is hidden. It's time we called people on this, at least, sloppy practice.
Sunday, 5 September 2010
K-scepticism and c-scepticism (part 1 of, probably, 3)
This post started of as a brief post on why I didn't like spelling "scepticism" with a "k". I thought, in fact I still think, that those who call themselves skeptics pay far too much (that is to say "some") deference to authoritarian views of epistemology. To say why, though, I found I had to spell out x and in spelling out x I needed to address y and so on. The post grew into a summary of all that I currently think in this area. The post will, to bring it back down to manageable proportions, be split into three. This first adresses the traditional view of knowledge. The second further criticises the traditional view of knowledge. The third develops Popper's ideas of conjectural knowledge and seeks to promote its advantages.
Introduction
Since the time of the Ancient Greeks it has been held that knowledge must have a warranting basis. The basis differs depending on the analyst. There are claims of knowledge from authority, by divine revelation, by derivation from self-evident ideas, clear and distinct ideas, a reliable methodology, evidence, proper function and others. Some are held to stand alone, some in combination with others but all are held by someone to be necessary for knowledge and, in combination with truth and belief, sufficient for knowledge.
“Scepticism” has been used to denote many attitudes of denial. Sometimes it is used to denote denial of specific things, denial of the external world, denial of logic or morals or rationality. More globally it denotes denial of knowledge which, in its milder form, denotes denial of knowledge unless certain conditions are met. Here the sceptic takes a position of being resistant to belief. The sceptic will not allow as known, and resolves as a consequence not to believe, propositions with insufficient evidence or that have not been derived from a reliable methodology, received from an authority, or the like. This is the scepticism currently popular. In particular there is a desire for science and evidence, the sceptic will reject beliefs not derived from a scientific investigation or not backed by sufficient evidence. Once the proposition is adequately supported by scientific evidence, this sceptic will likely invert his attitude to the proposition and insist that others put aside their doubts. As the spelling of sceptic as “sketpic”, with a “k”, is also fashionable, I will use the term k-sceptic.
Another scepticism is a little more extreme. The other scepticism demands neither warrant nor warranting basis, this scepticism denies the possibility of a warranting basis. I will use the term c-sceptic. It follows from the denial of warranting basis that the c-sceptic must deny knowledge, as traditionally thought of. The c-sceptic uses the word “knowledge” all the time, though. The c-sceptic is quite happy to claim knowledge, allow that others know, even to claim that he knows that others know. If he is not to be ridiculously contradictory in his beliefs the c-sceptic must mean something different from warranted, true, belief when talking of knowledge. I will refer to this knowledge as c-knowledge. I will refer to the traditional concept of knowledge as k-knowledge.
I hope to convince the reader that k-skepticism is wrong, c-scepticism is right, that k-knowledge is unobtainable and its pursuit counter-productive. It draws, heavily, on the works of Karl Popper, his collaborators and critics. David Miller, Popper's research assistant and, later, collaborator and friend, may find the denial of authority of science and the treatment of the usefulness of warrant eerily familiar, should he chance upon the post.
K-knowledge
Truth
One of the Ancient Greeks’ concerns was to draw a distinction between episteme (knowledge) and doxa (belief). Yes, yes, you believe that the earth was created around 6,000 to 10,000 years ago, that the stars are a guide to our destiny and that Liverpool are a good football team but do you know?
Things that are rubbish are not known. You cannot know that the earth was created around 6,000 to 10,000 years ago in six days of twenty four hours because the earth was not created then. You cannot know that the stars are a guide to our destiny because the stars give no clue as to what awaits us. You cannot know that Liverpool are a good football team because they are a bunch of red, koppite, gobshites. The Greeks (and almost everybody) would say something has to be true to be known.
It is important to note that this “truth” is not truth, full and precise, but “reasonable truth”. “The earth is round”, for example, is not true. The earth is slightly fatter around the equator making it an “oblate spheroid”. It is reasonably true. The differences between a round earth and an oblate spheroid earth are so small and unimportant that the two can be said to be very similar, or “much the same”. One would have to be either extremely pedantic or working in a very specialised area to object to anyone saying that the earth is round. However, if we take it seriously that both are true we can end up in serious difficulties. There will be a point, call it “a”, which “round earth” says is on the face of the earth but “oblate spheroid earth” says is not on the face of the earth. Call the assertion that point a is on the face of the earth “p”. If we take “round earth” as fully and precisely true we must assent to p. If we hold “oblate spheroid earth” as fully and precisely true we must assent to the negation of p: ¬p (pronounced "not p"). If we hold both “round earth” and “oblate spheroid earth” to be fully and precisely true we must assent both to p and ¬p.
Now, think of something utterly ridiculous, say “lager is better than real ale”, “Led Zeppelin weren’t very good” or “Liverpool are a not a bunch of red, koppite, gobshites”, and call that q. Since p is true “p or q” must be true (“or” is taken to be “not both of these are false”). Now we have “p or q”, one of which cannot be false and, from ¬p, p is false. So q, anything you like, must be true. (This demonstration is taken from Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 426 -427)
Of course the non-earth-shape-specialist and non-pedant is happy to accept and use the reasonably true proposition that the world is round. For our purposes the there is no need to make a distinction between the reasonably true proposition and the actually true proposition. More, for our purposes, there is no need to maintain the qualification of “reasonable”, no harm will come if we just call “the earth is round” “true”. Difficulties will only arise if we enter the specialist area where greater precision is needed, succumb to pedantry or look in depth at epistemology. Many of the arguments against k-knowledge, counter-intuitively, are bolstered by a slackening of the truth condition. In the philosophical literature the fine distinction between “reasonable truth” and “truth” is often blurred. As, counter-intuitively, many of the arguments against k-knowledge are bolstered by a slackening of the truth condition it is important in what follows not to blur the distinction.
Warrant
So, to be known a statement has to be a “reasonable” approximation to the truth. But that is not enough for knowledge. Each team in a knockout competition may believe that they will win that competition. For one of them that belief will be true, yet they cannot be said to know. True (or reasonable approximation to true) belief does not make knowledge. We move from “what turns belief into knowledge” to “what turns reasonably true belief into knowledge”. This is warrant.
What warrant is fills many pages of many philosophical works. Its general character, however, is pretty clear; it acts kind of “stamp of approval” on the belief. As we are interested in the truth its primary function is to approvingly stamp that truth.
Consider telling the time and when it would be right to move from saying that one believed that the time was 8:55 to saying that one knew that the time was 8:55. A belief that the time is 8:55 is just that, a belief. A belief that the time is 8:55 when in fact it is 8:55 is a true belief. If one looked at a reliable clock, saw that it indicated 8:55, it was 8:55 and one believed that it was 8:55 then one may be said to know that it was 8:55.
The same cannot be said of the sofa. The sofa would look the same were it 8:50 or 9:00 and is thus not reliable. If it were 8:55 but one guessed 8:50 a look at the sofa would confirm 8:50. A look at the clock would deny 8:50 and simultaneously confirm 8:55. Providing the clock is reliable if it says 8:55 then 8:55 is true. It warrants the truth of 8:55 and thus, added to true belief, creates knowledge.
Thus a warrant for p has to be, at some level of reliability, of the form:
If warrant then p
and
If ¬p then not warrant
(Most logicians would consider “if w then p” to be identical to “if not p then not-w”)
So there we have a three-part elucidation of knowledge. For someone to know p:
1. One must believe p
2. p must be true
3. One must have a method of deciding whether p or ¬p such that, to a reasonable level of reliability, if p then you believe it and if not p then you do not
That is not quite the end of the matter. If your method is reliable then you would be foolish to not to follow it. This means that if your method says p you are going to believe p and p is going to be true. If your method says p then you know p. If your method says ¬p then you are going to believe ¬p and ¬p is going to be true. If your method says ¬p then you know ¬p. The first two conditions for knowledge are a consequence of the third and so knowledge boils down to the level of warrant you have for any assertion.
A basis
At a minimum the relationship between warrant and a proposition that it warrants is that the proposition can be inferred from the warrant (“if warrant then proposition”). This can be represented by a simple argument schema:
Warrant
_________
Proposition
For example, we can illustrate the “knowing what time it is” example:
The clock says that it is 8:55
____________________
It is 8:55
Or take the example of whatever navigation mechanism a migratory bird uses to “calculate” its route:
Navigation mechanism
_____________________
Route
The bird is said to “know” the route to take by virtue of a navigation mechanism. The bird infers, all be it non-consciously, the route from the navigation mechanism. The route is inferable from the navigation mechanism, if the route were materially incorrect the navigation mechanism would not produce it and the navigation mechanism tends to produce routes that are correct.
However this is not enough for the k-sceptic. The k-sceptic wants our choice of propositions to be as a result of the warrant. Whether the navigation mechanism does reliably inform the bird or no the bird has no choice in the matter, it will follow the route. The “sofa” example also fits the schema above or, perhaps better, the example of an unreliable clock:
The unreliable clock says that it is 8:55
_____________________________
It is 8:55
“It is 8:55” is clearly not known, the unreliable clock does not give warrant for “it is 8:55”. We should, according to the k-sceptic, reject “it is 8:55”. Where a reliable clock says 8:55 we do have warrant and, according to the k-scpetic we should accept “it is 8:55”.
If we are to follow the k-skeptic’s stipulation some way of distinguishing between the non-warrant and the warrant must be available. To do the job this way must, at some level of security, give assent to “this is warrant” when “this is warrant” is true and reject “this is warrant” when “this is warrant” is false. That is to say it would be warrant for our warrant:
The clock is accurate
_____________________________________
“The clock says it is 8:55” is warrant for “it is 8:55”
Or we could show it as a stepped schema, with each line warranting the one below it.
The clock is accurate
____________________
The clock says it is 8:55
____________________
It is 8:55
But of course “warrant for warrant” is, itself, warrant. If warrant is required to be warranted then “the clock is accurate” must be warranted. Perhaps we have, or someone else has, tested the clock and concluded that the clock is accurate:
The clock has been tested
____________________
The clock is accurate
____________________
The clock says it is 8:55
____________________
It is 8:55
It is pretty clear where this is going: each warrant for warrant itself requires warrant, resulting in an infinite series of warrants that can never be completed.
Perhaps you think that I am being too strict. Certainty requires an infinite regress but, just as we will accept something that is reasonably true rather than true simpliciter, we will accept a certain level of uncertainty. Unfortunately any regress combined with any level of uncertainty makes the situation worse. If we a 0.95 confident that a working clock will tell the correct time and we are 0.95 confident that this is a working clock then the chances of us having a working clock that has just told the right time is 0.95 x 0.95 = 0.9025. If we are 0.95 sure that the test we use does confer a 0.95 chance of the clock working then the chances slip back still, 0.95 x 0.9025 = 0.87375. The more levels of warrant that we add the more the chances of the end result reduce until, fairly soon, the difference between a warranted proposition and a complete guess are negligible. Warrant that fails to raise the probability that a proposition is true is no warrant at all.
Thus if we are to secure warrant a basis is needed to stop the regress. A set of secure propositions is needed to provide the initial warrant which can be carried to all further propositions. Some contenders for this basis are listed above: authority, divine revelation, self evidence, clear and distinct ideas, a reliable methodology, evidence, proper function. But which of these bases, or combinations of these bases, are to form the basis?
The prospective bases often differ markedly in the propositions they certify. The pronouncements of authority, for example, differ so radically from some of the pronouncements of evidence and the scientific method that if one were true the other, far from being reasonably true, could not be remotely true. We must, therefore, choose a basis and this creates a dilemma. If we try and justify our choice of basis we do not treat it as a basis, we claim some warrant for the choice which creates a new recess. On the other hand if we do not offer any justification then our choice is entirely uninformed and arbitrary.
Alternatively, we could follow the fundies in their (perhaps not favourite, but extremely annoying) argument that “the Bible is a revelation from God because the Bible says it is a revelation from God”. What do we say to that? Really that they have given us no argument at all, just restated a conclusion as a premise. A third way fails and we find ourselves in Hans Albert’s “Münchhaussen trilemma”. All searches for an ultimate basis of warrant must “end” in:
1. infinite regress
2. circularity, or
3. an arbitrary exemption from the need for warrant
(Hans Albert. (trans. Mary Rorty) 1985. Treatise on Critical Reason. Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University Press p. 18 or Wikipedia)
The k-sceptic, who insists on a basis for propositions, insists on something he will never have. There is no basis of knowledge, there is no primeval warrant and thus no warrant. There is no k-knowledge.
I sense a face-palm. “If we cannot know anything then we are all doomed” is the objection. Another is the enquiry as to whether, if I do not know that exiting my house from the front door is safe whilst exiting from the bedroom window is not, I do not jump out of the bedroom window every now and again. I will attempt an answer to the second objection later. First we must consider “if we
cannot know then we are all doomed”.
The first response is that, from the above, we cannot know anything. So, if we cannot know anything then we are all doomed, then we are doomed. There is little point in bewailing the fact and even less pretending we know just because we do not like the consequences of not knowing. We are better off finding ways to cope with our damnation.
There is another response, though, one a little more palatable but rather counterintuitive. “If we cannot know anything then we are all doomed” is false and a prime reason why it is false is because knowledge is useless.
That is the topic for the next part.
Saturday, 28 August 2010
Glenn Peoples' "A New Euthyphro": David Hume arrives
“Does God will us to do things because they are right, or are things right because God wills us to do them?”
(Euthyphro agreed to interpose “right” for “pious” in deference to his audience's 21st century language and Socrates uses the singular “God” to account for monotheism.)
Socrates hoped to show that Euthyphro could not “ground” his ethics in Divine Commands (the second half of the dilemma) because it is always possible to ask why God commands this or that (the first half of the dilemma).
This time, with the benefit of two thousand years of philosophy, Euthyphro avoids the implication that Divine Command provides no ground for ethics by positing the identity of divine commands with morality. If “rightness is the quality of being that which God commands” (p.6) then that is not disturbed one iota by asking why God commands it. The “why” question, although interesting, is not a question about the grounding of ethics: it is a question about the nature of God, quite a different subject. God may have reasons for choosing to forbid torture but those are not reasons for us to obey that injunction. The reason we ought not to torture people is that God forbids it.
David Hume now arrives to join the two protagonists. Declining the invitation to a game of backgammon, Socrates and Euthyphro recount the conversation so far.
Hume: Of course I would wave away Divine Command Theory with the claim that you cannot derive a “ought” statement from an “is” statement. But I know that Euthyphro would never allow that.
Euthyphro: I most certainly would not. Divine Command Theory starts from the idea that the “is” of God’s will creates the “ought” in us.
H: Quite so. But you will allow that the identity of the good allows me to substitute “you ought to do them” for “are right”.
E: I think so. Let me see “does God will one to do things because one ought do them, or ought one do them because God wills us to do them”. You know, I think that is better, it helps stop the confusion about God’s motives. Very well, we will adopt your re-formulation and I will say that one ought do things because God tells you to do them.
H: Wonderful. Now, supposing you and I are in the pub with Sartre. It is your round. Is there something that Sartre is morally obliged to drink? Ought Sartre have a pint of Real Ale?
E: You know that I am a colossal Real Ale snob, David, but not even I would suggest that there was a moral obligation on someone to avoid Lager. Sartre can ask for what he likes.
H: We can even say he ought to ask for what he likes, though that might be stretching the meaning of “ought” too far. It would be entirely correct, though, to say that you ought to get him what he asks for. If Sartre asks for a pint of Lager it would be bad, not very bad, but a little rude, to bring him a pint of Real Ale.
E: Agreed.
H: So you ought to buy a pint of Lager because Sartre asks you to. It makes no sense to ask whether you ought to buy a pint of Lager because Sartre asks you to or does Sartre ask you for a pint of Lager because it is right that he ought to ask for a pint of Lager. “Buying a pint of Lager” is identical to “the right thing to do”. Also, as it happens, Sartre is also a colossal Real Ale snob.
E: Strange for a Frenchman.
H: He is not a Frenchman. He is a clumsy conceit in a 21st Century philosophical dialogue. And part of that conceit is that the likelihood of him asking for a pint of Lager is around the same as God willing torture. So Sartre will ask for a pint of Real Ale and, as what is right is identical to Sartre’s wishes then the purchase of a pint of Real Ale is right.
E: This is beginning to sound like “Sartre Command Ethics”.
H: Precisely. And I am quite happy to accept that your recent arguments have established that Socrates’ question has not shown your Divine Command Ethics to be any worse than my Sartre Command Ethics.
E: That’s not much of a concession; your Sartre Command Ethics are appalling. Moral laws do not derive from Sartre’s wishes.
H: They do, I just gave you an example: it is right to buy Sartre a pint of Real Ale because Sartre wishes a pint of Real Ale. What is right to do is what Sartre wishes.
E: What is right to do is what Sartre wishes in this case. If Sartre wished me to torture someone then it would be the wrong thing to do.
H: Not in Sartre Command Ethics. I have identified the moral with the wishes of Sartre, just as you have identified the moral with the wishes of God. We both have a perfectly robust grounding for our ethics, mine in Sartre and yours in God, neither fall to the challenge in Socrates’ dilemma.
E: That is ridiculous. I have alternative arguments for why my view is correct. I did not bring them into the discussion with Socrates as his dilemma has no bearing on them. I am sure that you know that I do have these arguments, that they are quite good and that they are certainly better than any you have for Sartre ethics. Face the facts, David, you just made up Sartre Command Ethics, you have no reasons at all to adopt it other than that it is useful in an argument with me. That is not a good basis for morality.
H: Oh. You want a good basis of morality, not just a basis of morality?
E: Of course. There can be many prospective bases of morality, if we just allowed any prospective basis of morality to be a basis we would end up with relativism.
H: So, presumably, I should adopt a good basis.
E: Yes.
H: But the statement “I should adopt a good basis for morality” is a statement about morality, a meta-statement. You can identify morals with God’s wishes and force me to accept that identification only if you can separately establish this meta-moral statement. If you cannot establish it apart from the basis that it seeks to establish, I can do exactly the same in any ethical system I care to mention.
E: And I can establish it. Firstly…
H: Never mind the specifics, for the moment we will take them as read and agreed. All moral statements are derived from God’s wishes; they are true depending upon whether or not wills them so. There is another, meta-moral statement, which is dependent on arguments outside of God’s will. This is “you should adopt Divine Command Ethics”. If you like we can imagine that God wills “Divine Command Ethics” and preserve the universality of “one ought to do what God tells one to do”. God tells you to adopt Divine Command Ethics, you ought to adopt Divine Command Ethics and so you ought to do what God tells you. However this meta-moral statement could be wrong. It could be the case that you ought not to adopt Divine Command Ethics.
E: Ridiculous. God can never be wrong!
H: This is not about God being wrong; it is about you being wrong. You can be wrong Euthyphro, you could be wrong about Divine Command Ethics. If you are that concerned about God being right we can imagine that, if you are wrong about Divine Command Ethics then God does not will Divine Command Ethics.
E: And if I am right then God does command it.
H: Yes. So if Divine Command Theory is correct then God wills it. If Divine Command Theory is incorrect then God does not will it.
E: I do not like the sound of this. We are getting back to the dilemma.
H: Yes we are. But do not think to drop this stipulation. If you are wrong about Divine Command Ethics then you ought not to follow Divine Command Ethics. If God wills Divine Command Ethics then it is not the case that one ought to do what God wills.
E: I will, then, accept the stipulation.
H: So now answer me the question: is Divine Command Theory correct because God wills it or does God will it because it is correct?
Friday, 27 August 2010
The Moral argument for the existence of God and the Euthyphro
Simply expressed the moral argument for the existence of God is:
- If God did not exist then morals would not exist
- Morals exist
- Thus, God exists
What are these morals of which we speak? Naturally, the argument envisages a theistic theory of morals. If a non-theistic theory of morals is accepted the argument fails. If we hold to nihilism, the second premise fails: morals do not exist. If we hold to naturalism, emotivism, or relativism then the first premise fails. Naturalist, emotivist and relativist ethics can get along quite well without the existence of God.
The result is a corollary argument, often in the background, about the adequacy of non-theistic theories of morals. Non-theistic thories, it is alleged, do not explain morals, provide no basis for morals. The Euthyphro is often invoked to argue that theistic theories neither explain nor provide a basis for morals and, so, the theist is on just as sticky a meta-moral wicket as the non-theist. This leads to attacks on the Euthyphro, defences, and on.
Let us just ignore non-theist theories of morals, accept that they do not explain morality, can never do so and are just plain wrong. Let us also allow that that the Euthyphro fails to establish that theistic theories are non-explanatory, groundless or whatever bad things about theories it seeks to establish. The Euthyphro still has an effect, a fatal one, on the moral argument for the existence of God.
The Euthyphro is a whole dialogue but one that boils down to one question which can be paraphrased in terms of modern discourse:
“is something moral/immoral because God says so or does God say something is moral/immoral because it is”.
The key aspect for the moral argument is not that the Euthrypho forces an impossible choice, but that it forces a choice. Is morality contingent on God or not?
If it is not contingent then the moral argument fails at the first premise. The second premise is fine, we are all able to agree that morality exists, after all torturing babies for fun is wrong. But to establish the conclusion both premises are needed and the first plainly claims that morality is contingent on God.
If we hold that morality is contingent, of course, the first premise is fine. But we’ve left ourselves with everything to do with the second premise. We cannot appeal to well-worn examples of morality unless we can establish that these examples are moral truths. “Morality exists” entails, under a God-contingent meta-theory, that God has willed moral laws. The contingency of morality on God begs the question of his existence and requires that any necessary “acts”, or “willings”, on His part, have taken place. But that is not the evidence commonly given by those putting forward the moral argument.
For its effect the moral argument relies on non-God-contingent morality to get us to agree the second premise but relies on God-contingent morality to support the first. The Euthyphro prevents that equivocation and, in doing so, reveals the fallacy.
Saturday, 22 May 2010
The, modestly titled, Lloyd meta-protocol
I’ve been reading Ben Goldacre’s “Bad Science”. “Shocking” is one word I’d use. The people behind “Brain Gym”, “detoxing” footbaths, Patrick Holford, Homeopaths, most of the pharmaceutical industry, Gillian McKeith and others ought to be thoroughly ashamed of themselves.
“Puzzled” is another word I’d use. Why are so many trials, even those published in “prestigious” journals, misleading? Ben’s answer partly lies around:
1. Crap protocols
2. Crap write-up
3. Publication bias
I would like to make a suggestion as to how these three can be easily, and cheaply, combated. My suggestion is the, modestly titled, “Lloyd meta-protocol”.
The “Lloyd meta-protocol” is to be followed by a journal and consists of three things:
1. The publish/not publish decision is not taken after the results are known. Where it is to be published is not taken after the results are known. The decision is taken by peer-review of the protocol for the test. These protocols are published in the journal with space for letters criticising protocols. An amended protocol may be published making changes to meet criticisms of the protocol. No actual testing happens until after the protocol is “finalised”. (A protocol is “finalised” when a decision not to further amend it is taken.) Following this protocol actually stops badly designed trials being carried out.
2. The finalisation of the test protocol involves the advance acceptance of the paper by the journal and the agreement on the part of the researchers that there will be a paper. Any trials where the paper fails to materialise after a certain time-limit a reported on by a short one-paragraph assuming that the results were entirely negative. This part of the protocol protects against “publication bias”.
3. That agreement that the paper will be published might lead one to expect that any old crap knocked up by the researchers, with all the ways of being dishonest in the write up Ben told us about, will be accepted. The “Lloyd meta-protocol” avoids that by removing the task of writing up the paper from the research group and giving it to the journal. The test is written up by the journal. Sure, the research group will sit with the writer. The research group will suggest wording (perhaps, even, giving a draft of a paper to the journal) but the person who actually chooses which words are used and in which order will be a journal appointee.
Those “playing with a straight bat” should welcome these procedures. The criticism of the test protocols, at present, happens when all that expensive field research has been done. If those reading the paper are not happy about the protocols then that field research has been a waste of time and money. Under the Lloyd meta-protocol rejection happens early and rejection happens cheaply. They will be guaranteed the journal in which the results will appear. No need to sweat on this one, no need to work on some research only to find you can’t publish it in “Prestigious Journal” but only “Obscure Piece of Toilet Paper”. But there’s more. If “Prestigious Journal” follows the “Lloyd meta-protocol” then readers of the journal will know that all trials reported:
o Have peer-reviewed protocols
o Are not subject to publication bias
o Are written up independently of the researchers
In short, “Prestigious Journal” will become “Super-prestigious journal” and which researchers wouldn’t want to publish in that?
Those currently “playing it a bit dodgy” should be tempted by these procedures. As above, publication (if they followed the protocol) would be in “Super-prestigious Journal” following the Lloyd meta-protocol. How’s that going to sound? Pretty bloody good. If you’ve got a good product then you could make it look really good by playing a few dodgy tricks. But now you’d loose out on that “stamp of approval”. Does the prestige that can be got by fiddling protocols, dodgy write ups and publication bias really make up for the loss of the “stamp of approval”? Maybe, maybe not. But at least now they’ll have to think about it.
Medical professionals should adore these procedures. No more trailing through paper after paper just to find you should ignore the results. As well as publication in a Lloyd meta-protocol compliant journal being a “stamp of approval”, publication in a non-compliant journal is a warning sign. These people before they did the test were determined to do something dodgy. Avoid them:
- Try X, Y, Z it reduces the A, B, C count in populations 1,2,3
- Was that in “Super-prestigious Journal”?
- No, it was in “Obscure Piece of Toilet Paper”
- Go away then
- Try X, Y, Z it reduces the A, B, C count in populations 1,2,3
- Was that in “Super-prestigious Journal”?
- Yes, it was.
- Interesting, tell me more
The rest of us should welcome these procedures. Despite having read Ben’s book I do not have the ability to read through a medical research paper and, sorry Ben, I don’t really want to. I don’t think I can rely on an abstract (Ben’s taught me that much), but I’d be quite happy to rely on it if there was a big blue “Lloyd meta-protocol compliant” tick next to it.
The journals should welcome these procedures. It will increase their prestige (from prestigious to “super-prestigious) and, importantly, it’s easy for one journal to do it on its own, right now. We do not need a central registry of trials; the journal announces that it is its own registry. We don’t need some great world-conference to “renegotiate” a “settlement” on “conduct and publication of research”. “Obscure Piece of Toilet Paper” can remain as it is, you can’t hide bad results there anymore, just because “Super-prestigious Journal” (on its own) already has an agreement to publish it.
That’s probably the biggest argument in favour of the Lloyd meta-protocol: it doesn’t cost anything and you could start on Monday.
